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Agricultural Dualism, Incidence of Child Labour and Subsidy Policies 
 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The incidence of child labour is one of the most disconcerting problems in the transitional 
societies of developing economies. According to ILO (2002), one in every six children aged 
between 5 and 17 - or 246 million children are involved in child labour.1 If the “invisible” 
workers who perform unpaid and household jobs are included, it is likely that the estimates would 
shoot up significantly further.  
 
Available empirical evidences suggest that the concentration of child labour is the highest in the 
rural sector of a developing economy and that child labour is used intensively directly or 
indirectly in the agricultural sector2. In backward agriculture, the production techniques are 
primitive, use of capital is very low and child labour can almost do whatever adult labour does. 
Farming in backward agriculture is mostly done by using bullocks and ploughs and the cattle-
feeding is entirely done by child labour. Besides, at the time of sowing of seeds and harvest 
children are often used in the family farms for helping adult members of the family. The 
advanced agricultural sector on the other hand uses mechanised techniques of production and 
uses agricultural machineries like tractors, seeders/planters, sprayers and harvesters etc. and 
therefore does not require child labour in its production process. This type of agricultural dualism 
is a very common feature of the developing countries. The distinction between advanced and 
backward agriculture can be made on the basis of inputs used, economies of scale, efficiency and 
elasticity of substitution. Many of the farmers in the agricultural sector of a developing economy 
stick to old and unscientific methods of cultivation although in other parts of the economy the 
introduction of the so called ‘Green Revolution’ technology brought about revolutionary changes 
with respect to production technologies and use of modern inputs and the increase in factor 
productivity. However, the improved technology was designed for the best areas (irrigation, high 
                                                           
1 Out of 246 million about 170 million child workers were found in different hazardous works. 
Some 8.4 million children were caught in the worst forms of child labour including slavery, 
trafficking, debt bondage and other forms of forced labour, forced recruitment for armed conflict, 
prostitution, pornography and other illicit activities (ILO, June 2002). 
 
2 According to the ILO (2002) report (figure 4, pp. 36), more than 70 per cent of economically 
active children in the developing countries are engaged in agriculture and allied sectors. 
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soil fertility) with chemical-intensive technology. Although, Green Revolution has modernized 
agricultural technology, it is limited only to a few parts of a developing economy and only rich 
(large) farmers have been benefited from it. The small and marginal farmers continue to depend 
on rain-fed backward agricultural technique. Therefore, the adoption of the Green Revolution 
technology has led to an increase in the extent of agricultural dualism in a developing economy.   
 
The existing theoretical literature on child labour3, however, has not paid any attention so far to 
this kind of agricultural dualism and its implications on the problem of child labour. This is 
important because from the view point of the use of child labour, these two types of agricultural 
sectors differ and any changes in their output composition will affect the magnitude of child 
labour use in the agricultural sector. Agriculture in many countries is supported by government’s 
subsidy policies in the form of price support, export subsidy and credit support etc.  In a 
developing country like India, farmers in backward agriculture are given price support to protect 
them from sharp fall in their produce during the times of over supply in the market. 
Government’s Minimum Support Price mechanism is a very common form of government 
subsidy policy directed towards backward agriculture to ensure remunerative prices to farmers. 
Government also provides subsidised credit to encourage mechanised farming and increase 
productivity. Institutional credit at a subsidised rate is being provided to the farmers for the 
purchase of different kinds of farm machines like tractors, trailers, power tillers etc. These types 
of subsidy schemes are designed to benefit the poorer section of the working population who are 
the potential suppliers of child labour. It is therefore natural to expect that these fiscal measures 
will raise the earning opportunities of the poor households which in turn will lower the supply of 
child labour through positive income effect. However, the matter is not as straightforward as it 
appears to be at the first sight.  Apart from their impact on adult wages, these fiscal policies affect 
the relative output compositions of the two agricultural sectors and the earning opportunities of 
children as well.  Expansion/contraction of any form of agriculture at the cost of the other will 
affect the demand for child labour and therefore their price. An expansion of backward 
agriculture resulting from a price subsidy policy given to that sector, for example, will create 
more demand for child labour and raise the use of child labour in the economy. Even if there is a 
                                                           
3 See Basu an Van (1998), Basu (1999), Gupta (2000, 2002), Jaferey and Lahiri (2002), Ranjan 
(1999, 2001), Baland and Robinson (2000), Chaudhuri (2009), Chaudhuri and Dwibedi (2006, 
2007), Dwibedi and Chaudhuri (2009) among others. In the literature the supply of child labour 
has been attributed to factors such as abject poverty, lack of educational facilities and poor quality 
of schooling, capital market imperfection, parental attitudes including the object ives to maximize 
present income etc.   
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positive income effect due to increase in adult wages, the net effect on child labour is ambiguous. 
Any policy effect on the child labour incidence, therefore, should be carried out in a multi-sector 
general equilibrium framework to capture various linkages that may exist in the system. 
 
The present paper is designed to examine the implications of two different types of subsidy 
policies to the agricultural sectors of an economy on the child labour incidence in a general 
equilibrium framework. We consider a three-sector full-employment model with child labour. 
The economy is divided into two agricultural and one manufacturing sectors. One of the two 
agricultural sectors (sector 1) is the advanced agricultural sector that produces it output by means 
of adult labour, land and capital. The other agricultural sector, we call it backward agriculture 
(sector 2), also produces an agricultural commodity using adult labour, land and child labour. 
Finally, sector 3 produces a manufacturing product with the help of adult labour and capital. In 
this setup we have examined the consequences of a credit subsidy policy to advanced agricultural 
sector and a price subsidy policy designed to benefit backward agriculture on the aggregate 
supply of child labour in the economy. We have found that a price subsidy policy to backward 
agricultural sector is likely to be counterproductive while a credit subsidy to advanced agriculture 
may be effective in lessening the prevalence of child labour in the economy. The paper, therefore, 
questions the desirability of assisting backward agriculture so as to eradicate the problem of child 
labour in the society.   
 
 
2. The model 
 
 
We consider a small open economy with three sectors: two agricultural and one manufacturing 
sector. Sector 1 is the advanced agricultural sector that produces its output, 1X , by means of adult 
labour ( )L , land ( )N  and capital ( )K . The other agricultural sector, we call it backward 
agriculture (sector 2), produces its output, 2X ,  using adult and child labour ( )CL  and land. Sector 
2 does not require capital for its production. The land-output ratios in sectors 1, and 2 
( 1Na and 2Na ) are assumed to be technologically given. This assumption can be defended as 
follows. In one hectare of land the number of saplings that can be sown is given. There should be 
a minimum gap between two saplings and land cannot be substituted by other factors of 
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production. Besides, empirical evidence from developing countries, like India, suggests that the 
productivity per hectare of land has remained more or less unchanged over a long period of time.4 
 
It is sensible to assume that the backward agricultural sector is more adult labour-intensive vis-à-
vis the advanced agricultural sector with respect to land. This implies that 2 1
2 1
L L
N N
a a
a a
 , 
where sjia are input-output ratios. Available empirical evidence suggests that the concentration of 
child labour is the highest in the rural sector of a developing economy and that child labour is 
used intensively directly or indirectly in backward agriculture that uses primitive production 
techniques. The advanced agricultural sector, on the other hand, uses mechanised techniques of 
production and does not require child labour in production. Child labour is therefore specific to 
backward agriculture. The two agricultural sectors are the two informal sectors in the sense that 
the adult workers receive competitive wage,W , and these are the two export sectors of the 
economy. The formal sector (sector 3) is the import-competing sector that produces a 
manufacturing commodity, 3X using adult labour and capital. The formal sector faces a unionised 
labour market where workers receive a contractual wage W withW W . The adult labour 
allocation mechanism is the following. Adult workers first try to get employment in the formal 
sector that offers the higher wage and those who are unable to find employment in the said sector 
are automatically absorbed in the two informal sectors, as the wage rate there is perfectly flexible. 
Capital is completely mobile between sectors 1 and 3. Owing to the small open economy 
assumption all the three commodity prices , s,iP  are given internationally.  Competitive markets, 
excepting the formal labour market, constant returns to scale technologies with positive and 
diminishing marginal productivities of inputs and full-employment of resources are assumed. 
Commodity 1 is chosen as the numeraire. 
 
The following three equations present the zero-profit conditions relating to the three sectors of the 
economy. 
 
 
                                                           
4 In case of India, per hectare wheat production was 2708 kg in 2000-01 and it remained at 2708 
kg per hectare even for the year 2006-07. Besides, per hectare food grains production was 1734 
kg in 2001-02 and the corresponding figure for the year 2006-07 was 1756 kg indicating fairly 
constant land-output ratio. 
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1 1 1(1 ) 1L N r KWa Ra r S a                                                                                                   (1)                                                          
2 2 2 2 (1 )L C C N PWa W a Ra P S                                                                                      (2)  
3 3 3L KWa ra P                                                                                               (3)    
where R , r and CW  stand for return to land, return to capital and child wage rate, respectively. 
rS is the ad-valorem rate of credit subsidy
5 given to the advanced agricultural sector and 
PS stands for the rate of ad-valorem price subsidy given to backward agriculture.  
 
Complete utilization of adult labour, capital, land and child labour imply the following four 
equations, respectively. 
LXaXaXa LLL  332211                                                                                             (4) 
KXaXa KK  3311                                                                                                         (5) 
NXaXa NN  2211                                                                                                         (6) 
CC LXa 22                                                                                                                      (7) 
While endowments of adult labour, land and capital are fixed in the economy, the aggregate 
supply of child labour, CL , is endogenous and is determined from the utility maximizing behavior 
of the households.   
 
 
2.1. Household behaviour  
 
We derive the supply function of child labour from the utility maximizing behaviour of the 
representative altruistic poor household. There are L numbers of working families, which are 
classified into two groups with respect to the earnings of their adult members. The adult workers 
who work in the higher paid formal manufacturing sector comprise the richer section of the 
working population. On the contrary, labourers who are engaged in the informal agricultural 
sectors constitute the poorer section. There is now considerable evidence and theoretical reason 
for believing that, in developing countries, parents send their children to work out of sheer 
                                                           
5 It is easy to check that a price subsidy policy to advanced agriculture also produces the same 
effects. 
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poverty.  Following the ‘Luxury Axiom’6 of Basu and Van (1998), we assume that there exists a 
critical level of family (or adult labour) income, *W , such that the parents will send their 
children out to work if and only if the actual adult wage rate is less than this critical level. We 
assume that each worker in the formal manufacturing sector earns a wage income,W , sufficiently 
higher than this critical level7. So, the workers of the formal sector do not send their children to 
work. On the other hand, adult workers employed in the two agricultural sectors earn W amount 
of wage income, which is less than the critical wage , *W , and therefore send some of their 
children to the job market to supplement low family income.  
 
The supply function of child labour by each poor working family is determined from the utility 
maximizing behaviour of the representative altruistic household who works in the agricultural 
sectors. We assume that each working family consists of one adult member and ‘n’ number of 
children. The altruistic adult member of the family (guardian) decides the number of children to 
be sent to the work place ( )Cl . The utility function of the household is given by  
))(,,,( 321 ClnCCCUU                                                                                                    
The household derives utility from the consumption of the three commodities, iC s and from the 
children’s leisure. For analytical simplicity let us consider the following Cobb-Douglas type of 
the utility function.  
 )()()()( 321 ClnCCCAU                                                                                               (8) 
with 0A , 0,,,1   ; and, .1)(                          
It satisfies all the standard properties and it is homogeneous of degree 1.  
 
                                                           
6 Basu and Van (1998) have shown that if child labour and adult labour are substitutes 
(Substitution Axiom) and if child leisure is a luxury commodity to the poor households (Luxury 
Axiom), unfavourable adult labour market, responsible for low adult wage rate, is the driving 
force behind the incidence of child labour. According to the Luxury Axiom, there exists a critical 
level of adult wage rate, and any adult worker earning below this wage rate, considers himself as 
poor and does not have the luxury to send his offspring to schools. He is forced to send his 
children to the job market to supplement low family income out of sheer poverty.  
 
7 We can also quantify this critical value in our model. From equation (10) we can say that 
0Cl   if 
(1 ) Cn WW 

 . 
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The household maximizes its utility subject to the following budget constraint.  
)(332211 WlWCPCPCP CC                                                                                         (9) 
where, W is the income of the adult worker and CC lW measures the income from child labour.  
 
Maximizing the utility function subject to the above budget constraint and solving for Cl the 
following family child labour supply function can be derived. 8 
{(1 ) ( / )}C Cl n W W                                                                                                           (10) 
 
From (10) it is easy to check that Cl varies negatively with the adult wage rate, W . A rise in 
W produces a positive income effect so that the adult worker chooses more leisure for his 
children and therefore decides to send a lower number of children to the workplace. An increase 
in CW , on the other hand, produces a negative price effect, which increases the supply of child 
labour from each family.9 
 
There are )( 33 XaLL LI   number of adult workers engaged in the two informal sectors and 
each of them sends Cl  number of children to the workplace. Thus, the aggregate supply function 
of child labour in the economy is given by                                                                  
3 3[(1 ) ( / )]( )C C LL n W W L a X                                                                            (11)                                                                         
 
 
2.2.   The General Equilibrium Analysis 
 
 
Using (11), equation (7) can be rewritten as   
2 2 3 3[(1 ) ( / )]( )C C La X n W W L a X                                                                          (7.1) 
 
The general equilibrium structure of the economy is represented by equations (1) – (6), (7.1) and 
(11). There are eight endogenous variables in the system: 1 2 3, , , , , ,CW W R r X X X and CL and 
                                                           
8 See Appendix I for mathematical derivation. 
 
9 It may be checked that the results of this paper hold for any utility function generating a supply 
function of child labour that satisfies these two properties.  
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eight independent equations (namely equations (1)  (6), (7.1) and (11). The parameters in the 
system are: 2 3, , , , , , , , , , , rP P L K N W n S    and PS . Equations (1)  (3) constitute the price 
system. This is an indecomposable system with three price equations and four factor prices , 
, ,CW W r and R . So factor prices depend on both commodity prices and factor endowments. 
Given the child wage rate, sectors 1 and 2 together effectively form a modified Heckscher-Ohlin 
system as they use both adult unskilled labour and land in their production. Given the world 
prices and the unionised wage W , r is determined from equation (3). Now 1 2, , , ,CW W R X X  and 
3X are simultaneously obtained from equation (1), (2), (4) – (6) and (7.1).  Finally, CL is 
determined from (11). 
 
 
3. Comparative Statics 
 
 
The two agricultural sectors receive subsidies from the government. The subsidy schemes are 
designed to benefit the poorer section of the working population who are the potential suppliers 
of child labour. The conventional wisdom is that these fiscal measures will raise the adult 
incomes of the poor households which in turn lower the supply of child labour through positive 
income effect. This section is aimed at examining the efficacies of the two subsidy policies in 
mitigating the child labour problem in the economy. Two different subsidies are given to the two 
agricultural sectors. The advanced agricultural sector receives a credit subsidy at the rate rS while 
the backward agricultural sector gets a price subsidy at the rate PS .   
 
For determining the consequences of the subsidy policies on the child labour incidence after 
totally differentiating equation (1), (2), (4) –(6) and (7.1) and solving by Cramer’s rule the 
following two propositions can be established10.   
 
PROPOSITION 1: A credit subsidy policy to advanced agriculture leads to (i) decreases in both 
adult wage,W , and child wage, CW ; (ii) an increase in the )/( CWW  ratio thereby lowering the 
supply of child labour by each poor working family; (iii) an expansion (a contraction) of the 
advanced (backward) agricultural sector; and, (iv) an expansion of the manufacturing sector if  
                                                           
10 See Appendix II for detailed derivations. 
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1 12 1
2 1{ } 0KL NL N L LLS S    ⁯11. On the other hand, a price subsidy policy to backward 
agriculture produces the exactly opposite effects on  the wages, family supply of child labour and 
the composition of output of the economy.  
 
Proposition 1 can be explained in economic terms in the following fashion. As r  is determined 
from the zero profitability condition for sector 3 (equation (3)) and remains unchanged despite a 
change in rS and PS , sectors 1 and 2 together can effectively be regarded as a Modified 
Hechscher-Ohlin subsystem (MHOSS). The modification is due to the fact that those two sectors 
use adult labour and land, apart from the fact that sector 2 uses child labour and sector 1 uses 
capital as inputs.  An increase in rS (which effectively implies an increase in the price of 
commodity 1) raises the rate of return to land, R  and lowers the adult wage, W following a 
Stolper-Samuelson effect, as sector 2 is more adult labour-intensive than sector 1 with respect to 
land. This generates a Rybczynski type effect and produces an expansionary (a contractionary) 
effect on sector 1 (sector 2). This is a well-known result in the theory of international trade that a 
Stolper-Samuelson effect contains an element of Rybczynski effect if the technologies of 
production are of the variable coefficient type. As sector 2 contracts the demand for child labour 
falls as this is specific to this sector. Consequently, the child wage rate falls. It is easy to check 
that the proportionate fall in child wage rate is greater than that in adult wage so 
that )/( CWW rises. This lowers the supply of child labour by each working family, Cl . As rS  
increase the effective price of capital net of subsidy falls. But the adult wage rate has also fallen. 
It can be easily shown that wage-rental ratio falls and producers in sector 1 substitute capital by 
labour resulting in a decrease in 1Ka . But as sector 1 has expanded the net effect on the demand 
for capital in sector 1 is ambiguous. However, it can be proved that capital demand falls in sector 
1 under the sufficient condition that 1 12 12 1{ } 0KL NL N L LLS S    . If this happens the released 
capital goes to sector 3 thereby causing it to expand.  On the contrary, a price subsidy to 
backward agriculture produces exactly the opposite effects on factor prices and output 
                                                           
11 Here kjiS is the degree of substitution between factors j and i in the k th sector 
with 0kjiS for ij  ; and, 0
k
jjS  while ji is the allocative share of j th input in i th sector. 
Besides, 12 1 2 1 2( ) 0NL N L L N        as the backward agriculture (sector 2) is more adult 
labour-intensive vis-à-vis the advanced agriculture (sector 1) with respect to land.  
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composition.  The supply of child labour by each poor working families rises and sector 3 
contracts under the same sufficient as stated above.  
 
3.1  Agricultural subsidy policies and incidence of child labour 
 
For examining the implications of the subsidy policies on the incidence of child labour i n the 
economy we use the aggregate child labour supply function, which is given by equation (11). We 
note that any policy affects the supply of child labour in two ways: (i) through a change in the 
size of the informal sector adult labour force, )( 33 XaLL LI  , as these families are considered 
to be the suppliers of child labour; and, (ii) through a change in Cl (the number of child workers 
supplied by each poor family), which results from a change in the ( / )CW W ratio. Differentiating 
equation (11) the following proposition can be proved.12 
  
PROPOSITION 2: A credit subsidy to the advanced agricultural sector is effective in reducing 
the gravity of the problem of child labour in the economy either if 1 12 12 1{ } 0KL NL N L LLS S    ; 
or if, 2 1 2 1LC KL CC LLS S S S . On  the contrary, a price subsidy policy directed towards backward 
agriculture aggravates the child labour problem under anyone of the above two sufficient 
conditions.  
 
As explained previously, a credit subsidy policy to advanced agriculture raises the 
)/( CWW ratio, which in turn lowers the supply of child labour from each poor working family. 
On the other hand, as the formal sector expands the number of poor working families, which are 
considered to be the suppliers of child labour, )( 33 XaL L , decreases.   So, we have a situation 
where there is less number of poor families each supplying less number on child labors. So the 
supply of child labour unambiguously falls. A price subsidy policy to backward agriculture 
produces exactly the opposite effects thereby raising the supply of child labour in the society. 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
12 This has been derived in Appendix IV. 
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4. Conclusion remarks 
 
In a developing country the government often tinkers with market mechanism using its tax and 
subsidy policies for different purposes. It is a common belief that the backward agricultural sector 
should be subsidized as poorer group of the working population are employed in this sector who 
send their children out to work out of sheer poverty. If the economic conditions of these people 
can be improved the social menace of child could automatically be mitigated. The analysis of this 
paper has challenged this populist belief using a three-sector general equilibrium model with 
child labour and agricultural dualism. The advanced agriculture is distinguished from backward 
agriculture as follows. The former uses capital in the form of agricultural machineries that 
prevents child labour to work on these farms. On the contrary, backward agriculture uses 
primitive techniques of cultivation and employs child labour in a significant number. Apart from 
this, backward agriculture uses more labour-intensive (adult labour) technique vis-à-vis advanced 
agriculture with respect to land.  In this backdrop we have examined the consequences of a credit 
subsidy policy to advanced agricultural sector and a price subsidy policy designed to benefit 
backward agriculture on the aggregate supply of child labour in the economy. We have found that 
a price subsidy policy to backward agricultural sector is likely to aggravate the child labour 
problem while a credit subsidy to advanced agriculture may be effective in reducing the gravity 
of the problem in the economy. The paper, therefore, questions the desirability of assisting 
backward agriculture so as to eradicate the problem of child labour in the society.   
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Appendix I: Derivation of family supply function of child labour  
 
Maximizing equation (8) with respect to 321 ,, CCC and Cl  and subject to the budget constraint 
(9) the following first-order conditions are obtained.  
))/()(())/()(())/()(())/()(( 332211 CC WlnUCPUCPUCPU                       (A.1) 
From (A.1) we get the following expressions.  
)}/()({ 11 PWlnC CC                                                                                                      (A.2) 
)}/()({ 22 PWlnC CC                                                                                                     (A.3) 
)}/()({ 33 PWlnC CC                                                                                                      (A.4)                                                   
 
Substitution of the values of 1C , 2C and 3C into the budget constraint and further simplifications 
give us the following child labour supply function of each poor working household.  
 
)}/(){( CC WWnl                                                                                             (10) 
 
 
 
Appendix II: Changes in factor prices 
 
As r is determined from equation (3), it is independent of any changes in rS  and PS . In other 
words, we have ˆ 0.r   
 
 
Now we totally differentiate equations (1), (2), (4) – (6) and (7.1), collecting terms and arranging 
in a matrix notation we get the following expression.  
  
1 1
2 2 2
2
2 1 2 3
1
1 1 3
1 2
2 2 3
3
0 0 0 0
0 0 0
0
0 0 0
0 0 0 0
( ) 0 ( ) 0 1
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L N
L N C
LL L LC L L L
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N N
L
CL CC
C C C C L
S S
S
W WS S
l W l W
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   
  
 
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
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 
 
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 
    
1
2
3
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
C
W
R
W
X
X
X
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
=
ˆ.
ˆ.
0
0
0
0
r
P
H S
G S
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
        (A.5) 
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Solving (A.5) by Cramer’s rule the following expressions are obtained. 
2 2 2 2
2 1 2 2 2 1 2 1
1 1ˆ ˆˆ { ( ) } { ( ) }L LC CC N r L LC CC N P
C C C C
W WW S A S A HS S A S A GS
l W l W
         
 
 (A.6) 
1 2
1 1 3 2 2
1 ˆˆ { ( ) }C LL K KL CL N r
C C
WW S A S A S A HS
l W
     

 
          1 21 1 3 2 1
1 ˆ{ ( ) }LL K KL CL N P
C C
WS A S A S A GS
l W
    

                                                     (A.7) 
2 2 2 2
2 1 2 2 2 1 2 1
1 1ˆ ˆˆ { ( ) } { ( ) }L LC CC L r L LC CC L P
C C C C
W WR S A S A HS S A S A GS
l W l W
          
 
 
                                                                                                                                                  (A.8) 
where, kjiS  the degree of substitution between factors j and i in the k th sector, , , ,Cj i L L K ; 
and, k = 1,2,3. 0kjiS for ij  ; and, ;0
k
jjS and, ji proportion of the j th input employed 
in the i th sector and, 
1 0(1 )
r
K
r
SH
S
 

; 
0
(1 )
P
P
SG
S
 

; 
1 2
1 2( ) 0;LL L LL L LLS S S     
2 2
2 1 2 1 2 1 2[{ ( ) }( )L LC CC L N N L
C C
WS A S A
l W
          
       1 21 2 1 1 3 2{ ( ) }] 0N C LL K KL CL
C C
WS A S A S A
l W
        
                                                                                   (A.9) 
 
2 3 1 2 1 2 1 3 2( ) 0K N L L N K L NA             
3 1
3 2 3 1 1 3 1
3 3
1 ( ) 0
1 1
L L
N L L N L L
L L
A       
 
   
 
 
12
1 2 1 2( ) 0NL N L L N        as we have assumed that the backward agricultural sector is more 
adult labour-intensive vis-à-vis the advanced agricultural sector with respect to land both in 
3
1 1 2 1 3
3
( . ) 0
1
L
K N N K
L
A    

  

16 
 
physical and value sense. The latter implies that 1 2 1 2( ) 0L N N L      which in turn shows that 
0  .  
 
Now subtraction of (A.7) from (A.6) yields 
ˆ ˆ( )CW W 
2 2 2 1
1 2 2 1 3 2
1 ˆˆ ˆ( ) [ ( ) ( ) )]C L LC LL CC CL K KL N rW W A S S A S S S A HS       
 
                 2 2 2 11 2 2 1 3 1
1 ˆ[ ( ) ( ) )]L LC LL CC CL K KL N PA S S A S S S A GS      
                             
Using the expression of LLS we can further simplify the expression of ˆ ˆ( )CW W as follows.   
1 1
1 1 1 3 2
1 ˆˆ ˆ( ) [ ]C L LL K KL N rW W A S S A HS    
 
                 1 11 1 1 3 1
1 ˆ[ ]L LL K KL N PA S S A GS   
                                                                    (A.10) 
[Note that  2 2( ) 0CC CLS S   and 
2 2( ) 0LL LCS S  , (note that as 2Na is constant 
2 0CNS  and 
2 0LNS  .] 
 
Using (A.9), from (A.6) – (A.8) and (A.10) we can obtain the following results. 
 
(i) ˆ ˆ0, 0W R   and 0ˆ CW when ˆ 0rS  ;                                                                              
(ii) ˆ ˆ0, 0W R   and ˆ 0CW  when ˆ 0PS  ;   
(iii) ˆ ˆ( ) 0CW W    when  ˆ 0rS                                                                                (A.11) 
(iv) ˆ ˆ( ) 0CW W   when ˆ 0PS   
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Appendix III: Changes in output composition 
 
Solving (A.5) by Cramer’s Rule we derive the  following expressions as well. 
 
2 2 2 1
1 2 3 3 1 3
1ˆ [( ) ( )( )CL L LC K CC LL K K KL L
C C C C
W WX S S S S S
l W l W
         

  
               2 13 2 1 2 2
3
ˆ)]
(1 )
L
L LC K KL N N r
L
S S HS    



 
     2 2 2 12 3 3 1 3
1 [( ) ( )( )CL L LC K CC LL K K KL L
C C C C
W WS S S S S
l W l W
         

 
             2 13 2 1 1 2
3
ˆ)]
(1 )
L
L LC K KL N N P
L
S S GS    



 
Or, 
2 1 1 2 13
1 1 3 1 3 2 1 2 2
3
1 ˆˆ [ ( )( ) )]
(1 )
L
CC L LL K K KL L L LC K KL N N r
C C L
WX S S S S S HS
l W
        

    
 
  
      2 1 1 2 131 3 1 3 2 1 1 2
3
1 ˆ[ ( )( ) )]
(1 )
L
CC L LL K K KL L L LC K KL N N P
C C L
WS S S S S GS
l W
        

    
 
   (A.12) 
 
2 1 1 2 13
2 1 3 1 3 2 1 2 1
3
1 ˆˆ [ ( )( ) )]
(1 )
L
CC L LL K K KL L L LC K KL N N r
C C L
WX S S S S S HS
l W
        

     
 
  
       2 1 1 2 131 3 1 3 2 1 1 1
3
1 ˆ[ ( )( ) )]
(1 )
L
CC L LL K K KL L L LC K KL N N P
C C L
WS S S S S GS
l W
        

    
 
  (A.13)                            
[We have used the expression of LLS  and note that 
2 2 0LC LLS S   and 2 2 0CC CLS S  ] 
 
2 1 2 1
3 2 1 2 1 1
1ˆ [{( ) }CC L K KL L LC K KL N
C C
WX S S S S
l W
       

  
            2 2 2 12 1 1 1 1 2 2 ˆ{( ) ( )( )} ]LC L LC K CC LL K L K KL N N r
C C C C
W WS S S S S HS
l W l W
             
       2 1 2 12 1 2 1 1
1 [{( ) }CC L K KL L LC K KL N
C C
WS S S S
l W
       

 
    2 2 2 12 1 1 1 1 2 1 ˆ{( ) ( )( )} ]LC L LC K CC LL K L K KL N N P
C C C C
W WS S S S S GS
l W l W
             
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    Or, 
2 1 2 1 12 1
3 2 1 2 1 1 2
1 ˆˆ [ ( ){ }]L LC KL N CC KL NL N L LL K N r
C C
WX S S S S S HS
l W
          

   
                                                     (-)                  (+)                   ( -)     
        2 1 2 1 12 12 1 2 1 1 1
1 ˆ[ ( ){ }]L LC KL N CC KL NL N L LL K N P
C C
WS S S S S GS
l W
          

             (A.14) 
                                                 (-)                          (+)                ( -) 
 
From (A.12) - (A.14) we get the following  
(v) 1 2ˆ ˆ0, 0X X  when ˆ 0rS  ;                                                                         
1 2
ˆ ˆ0, 0X X  when ˆ 0PS  ; 
(vi) 3ˆ 0X  when ˆ 0rS                                                                                              (A.15) 
              under the sufficient condition 1 12 12 1{ } 0KL NL N L LLS S     
(vii) 3ˆ 0X  when ˆ 0PS   under the same sufficient condition.                                             
                        
 
Appendix IV: Proof of proposition 3 
 
Totally differentiating equation (11) we get the following 
3
3
3
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( )
(1 )
L
C C
C C L
WL W W X
l W


   

 
We now substitute the expressions of  3Xˆ   and  ˆ ˆ( )CW W    from (A.14) and (A.10) respectively 
to get the following expression. 
1 1
1 1 1 3
1ˆ [ ( )C L LL K KL
C C
WL A S S A
l W
    

            
              2 1 2 1 12 13 2 1 2 1 1 2
3
ˆ{ ( )( )} ]
(1 )
L
L LC KL N CC KL NL N L LL K N r
L C C
WS S S S S HS
l W
       

    

 
      1 11 1 1 3
1 [ ( )L LL K KL
C C
W A S S A
l W
    

        
           2 1 2 1 12 13 2 1 2 1 1
3
{ ( )( )} ]
(1 )
L
L LC KL N CC KL NL N L LL K
L C C
WS S S S S
l W
      

    
 1
ˆ
N PGS      (12) 
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From (12) we get the following results. 
ˆ 0CL  when ˆ 0rS   under the sufficient condition 
1 12 1
2 1{ } 0KL NL N L LLS S     
ˆ 0CL  when ˆ 0PS   under the same condition. 
 
Rewriting (12) in a different way it can be checked that the above two res ults also hold under the 
sufficient condition that 2 1 2 1LC KL CC LLS S S S . 
 
 
